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Abstract
This paper presents a case study of the Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines, and Virgin Atlantic transatlantic joint
venture, one of the world’s largest strategic passenger joint ventures. The study used a qualitative research
approach. The data gathered for the study was examined by document analysis. The strategic analysis of
the joint venture was based on the use of Porter’s Five Forces Model. The study found that the joint venture
has evolved over time through the addition of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Alitalia, and Virgin Atlantic Airways
to the original joint venture between Air France and Delta Air Lines. The joint venture has provided significant
synergistic benefits to the partners and has allowed the partners to access new markets and to participate in the
evolution of the transatlantic air travel market, one of the world’s major air travel markets. The joint venture has
also enabled the venture partners to enhance their competitive position through strengthened service offerings,
a comprehensive route network that offers customers a high level of connectivity, and greater flight frequencies
within their own route networks, all of which creates value for the partners. A limitation of the study was that the
annual revenue, revenue passenger kilometres performed, or passenger load factors data was not available. It
was, therefore, not possible to analyze the business performance of the joint venture.
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1. Introduction
The global air transport industry has witnessed a number of
significant changes since the deregulation of the United States
air travel market in the late 1970s and the European industry in
the 1990s. These changes include a reduction in the number of
major airlines, the intensified reorganization of airline routes
into hub-and-spoke networks, the rapid growth in the number
of low-cost carriers (LCCs) and, still occurring, the forma-
tion of strategic alliances between international carriers. The
latter represents a significant innovation in the global airline
industry. Since the first major alliance between KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines and Northwest Airlines in the early 1990s, the
number of far-reaching strategic alliances has been increasing.
[1]
Over the past decade or so, airlines have sought to ex-
tend their reach and service offerings on a global basis. Be-
cause of the cost associated with overcoming various rigidities
in international air transport markets – bilateral air services
agreements (ASAs) restrictions, prohibitions against cabo-
tage, the availability of airport slots and other facilities, and so
forth, large full-service network carriers (FSNCs) have found
it advantageous to link up with other airlines, thereby form-
ing global networks. [2] Furthermore, airlines all around the
world have focused on strategic alliances for satisfying cus-
tomer needs. This is especially so in the current air transport
industry environment which is dominated by global integra-
tion, demanding customer requirements, and rapidly changing
technologies. [3] Airlines have also ratified strategic alliance
agreements and partnerships in order to create competitive
advantage, reduce their costs, and to expand their marketable
network reach. [4]
In the broadest sense, alliances involve collaboration be-
tween two or more businesses that retain their autonomy
during their relationship [5]. In the global airline indus-
try there are many different types of alliances: asset pools
[6, 7], blocked-space, revenue sharing and “wet-lease” agree-
ments [8], code-share agreements [9, 10], cost-sharing ven-
tures [7, 11], equity investments [7, 12], feeder agreements
[7, 13, 14], interline pro-rate agreements [15], marketing al-
liances [7, 9, 16], and joint ventures [7, 9]. The focus of the
present study is on the latter strategic option.
The objective of this paper is to examine the development
and evolution of the transatlantic strategic joint venture be-
tween Air France-KLM, Delta Airlines and Virgin Atlantic
Airways. An additional aim of the study is to examine how the
joint venture has enhanced the partner’s competitive position
in the transatlantic air travel market. The Air France-KLM,
Delta Air Lines and Virgin Atlantic Airways joint venture
was selected for the study as this is one of the world’s largest
airline joint ventures. Also, the joint venture was selected for
the case study due to the availability of documentary evidence
that was readily available in the public domain that covers
then joint venture inception through to the time of the present
study.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the
literature review presented in Section 2 commences with an
overview of joint ventures and subsequently examines Porter’s
Five Forces Model. The study’s research method is described
in Section 3. The case study is presented in Section 4. The
key findings of the study are presented in Section 5.
2. Background
2.1 Joint venture partnerships
Firms enter into alliance agreements for various strategic rea-
sons. Amongst these, the one central to this study is the
strategic joint venture. According to Yan and Luo [17], inter-
national joint ventures “are joint ventures that involve firms
from different countries cooperating across national and cul-
tural boundaries”. In the global airline industry, a joint venture
has been defined as a joint business that extends beyond exist-
ing partnerships and is one which encompasses code-sharing
or being a member of a global alliance.[18] Thus, joint ven-
tures are separate entities which are typically owned jointly by
two or more firms. The joint venture also represents a partial
combination of the partner’s resources [19], and the owners
participate in governing the new business entity. [20, 21]
2.2 The motives for joint venture partnerships for-
mation
The motives for firms forming joint ventures has attracted a
lot of attention in the extant literature. One critical reason that
firms decide to form a joint venture is the reduction in risk.
[22, 23] By combining resources and expertise the two firms
can reduce the risk to both parties as the risks can be equally
shared.[24] Furthermore, Harrigan [25] suggests that “joint
ventures offer shared-equity control and shared returns, with
lower risks to bear if firms pursued strategic objectives alone”.
A further motivation for forming a joint venture is the joint
saving of costs [26] as well as the pooling of competencies and
distinctive resources. [23, 26, 27] A common motive for the
formation of joint ventures is the objective of achieving cost
savings through the rationalization of fixed costs or through
the sharing of the partners’ capital investment programs. [28]
The investment capital required for the joint venture can be
easier to arrange as financial institutions will evaluate the
strength of two or more firms instead of just one single firm.
[29]
Gaining access to new markets is another often cited rea-
son that firms form a joint venture. [25, 30, 31] In addition
to gaining access to new markets, a joint venture can en-
able a partner to expand the size of its customer base. This
is achieved by using its partner’s strength in different geo-
graphic markets.[28] Joint ventures also enable the partners
to increase their market share, whilst also enhancing their
competitive position in markets.[32] This latter motivation
is especially important to the present study as full-service
network carriers (FSNCs) compete in the premium and leisure
travel market segments [33, 34]; these market segments are
often characterized by extremely high levels of competition.
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Synergy has been highlighted in the literature as a further
motivation for the formation of joint ventures.[21] This is
because the joint utilization of complementary resources, core
competencies, and skill sets possessed by the joint venture
partners can create synergistic effects.[30] Such benefits may
not be captured if the firms are acting alone.
A further motivation for forming a joint venture is to en-
able the partners to participate in the industry’s evolution
[32], whilst at the same time helping to reduce competitive
volatility.[25] Furthermore, the formation of a joint venture
may enable the partners to pre-empt competitors (first movers’
advantages), the partners may gain rapid access to better firms,
the partners can add capacity or vertical integration, the part-
ners may also achieve advantageous terms, and providing the
joint venture with the best partners [25]. Furthermore, a joint
venture may also enable the partners to capture competitive
advantage. This competitive advantage is captured by the joint
venture partners pre-empting competitors, thus enabling the
joint venture firms to expand their customer base (as well as
their market-share).[35]
2.3 The joint venture success factors
Many key success factors have been suggested in the liter-
ature for joint ventures. First, the selection of the partner
is of vital importance. There must be the correct “fit” for
the specific joint venture. For this “fit”, the partners need to
have complementary technical skills and resources, compati-
ble cultures, and clearly-specified objectives and performance
criteria.[28] Second, there must be a spirit of trust, coopera-
tion, and integrity between the joint venture partners. Third,
both strategic and operational synergies must prevail between
the partners. The potential results of the joint venture need
to be reasonable.[35] Fourth, as the joint venture matures the
parent firms must be prepared to address possible new risks.
They also need to be prepared to change the structure of the
joint venture organization in response to changing operating
conditions.[36] Finally, a critical factor is a favourable past
association with the other partner(s).[37, 38, 39]
2.4 Rationale for forming strategic alliances and joint
ventures in the global airline industry
Joint ventures (JVs) are being ratified across the world airline
industry, thereby enabling airlines to deliver greater choice to
consumers whilst at the same time growing their businesses.
Examples of joint ventures include Air France-KLM-Alitalia
and Delta Airlines across the Atlantic; Japan Airlines, British
Airways and Finnair linking Japan and Europe [40]; and
the Delta Air Lines and Korean Air joint venture across the
Pacific.[41, 42]
There are a variety of reasons and strategic factors which
drive the formation of strategic airline alliances and joint
ventures in the global airline industry. These range from over-
coming bilateral air services agreements (ASAs) restrictions
through to the alliance members sharing access to assets, re-
sources and competencies [1]. Figure 1 shows the specific
factors or rationale that has motivated airlines to form strategic
airline alliances.
2.4.1 Economic restructuring of the global airline indus-
try
Economic restructuring through the philosophy of “economic
disengagement” by governments around the world, has, over
the past three decades, had a substantial impact on the world
airline industry. The principal forms of industry restructuring
have occurred through privatization of airlines and deregula-
tion of markets. [43] The 1944 Chicago Convention on In-
ternational Civil Aviation established the bilateral systems of
air services agreements (ASA’s) between governments, which
have since governed international air transport.[44, 45] The
international air transport market that developed was charac-
terized by national airlines from each country serving routes,
airlines often charging the same air fares, and often sharing
markets and revenues. Some bilateral air services agreements
(ASAs) also stipulated conditions governing responsibility
for such matters as passenger and aircraft ground handling.
The terms of the bilateral agreements reflected the negotiat-
ing power and current air transport policies of the respective
countries involved and resulting productivity was often quite
low with the costs often being high.[46]
Since the end of the 1970s the international air trans-
port industry regulatory regime has been characterized by
the continuous deregulation of air transport markets. This
trend commenced with the deregulation of the United States
domestic market in 1978 [47, 48] followed by Canada, the
United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand in the 1980s
and the completion of full deregulation of the European Union
in April 1997. [43] Consequently, airlines are increasingly
free to allocate their resources in both space and time. [47]
Following deregulation, the world air transport system has
become much more competitive.[49]
A further, and linked, aspect of economic restructuring is
a global movement towards the privatization of state-owned
airlines.[50, 51] Nonetheless, despite this gradual process
there are still some international airlines that remain publicly
owned or have major government shareholdings.[43]
The European Union third air transport market liberal-
ization package implemented from April 1997 permitted Eu-
ropean Union (EU) registered airlines to purchase majority
ownership of other EU carriers and establish airlines in other
EU countries.[52, 53] In the United States, for example, for-
eign shareholdings of up to 49% of the airlines issued shares
(equity) and 25% of voting stock is possible, although the
United States Government also imposes an ad hoc control test
to ascertain whether the foreign shareholder would substan-
tially influence decision making irrespective of the level of
shareholding.[43, 54]
In addition, alternative methods of strategic development,
namely internally generated growth and mergers and acqui-
sitions are often precluded as viable growth strategies for
international airlines, and hence, the formation of strategic
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Figure 1. The factors influencing the formation of strategic alliances and joint ventures in the global airline industry. Source:
adapted from [1]
alliances is, in many instances, the only available form of
market entry available to them.[43]
2.4.2 Gain entry to international air travel markets
In order to gain access to an air travel market which is re-
stricted by bilateral air services agreements (ASAs) an alliance
enables an airline to serve such markets without obtaining the
right to do so through country-negotiated bilateral agreements.
Thus, global airline service networks are most likely to be
formed by alliance partners residing and operating in different
continents in order to benefit most from the enlarged route
network served by becoming an alliance member.[55]
2.4.3 The creation of a global seamless route network
Customers prefer airlines who offer a large route network
since they can minimize their travel time, increase the number
of online connections, and participate in better frequent flyer
programs.[55] Accordingly, airlines are seeking to optimize
their “global reach”, in the belief that those who offer a global
service (with a competitively credible presence in each of
the major air travel markets) will be in the strongest strategic
position. Hence, globalization, and especially developments
in key air travel markets is an important external driver for
strategic airline alliance formation.[43] Furthermore, in the
global airline industry, a joint venture enables the partner
airlines to coordinate their flights, airline route planning, and
their route networks. The joint venture partners can also
coordinate the level of seating capacity in a market.[9] In
addition, the strategic alliance therefore enables airlines to
provide their clients with a greater range of potential routes
and destinations.[56]
2.4.4 Economies of scale, scope and learning
Undoubtedly, a prime motive for collaboration amongst air-
lines is to improve profitability; economies can be realized
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through shared airport facilities, combined sales operations,
for example, in combination with an extended route network.[57]
Thus, a principal driver for alliance formation is for the airlines
to achieve cost economies of scale, scope and experience.[46]
Economies of scale exist where the average cost per unit of
airline output declines as the level of the airline’s output in-
creases [58]. Joint activities, for example, in parts-pooling or
aircraft ground handling, help airlines to reduce their costs
and/or create economies of scale.[55] In addition, strategic
alliances reduce airline costs through economies of scale asso-
ciated with joint marketing, maintenance, training, computer
reservation systems, and through the elimination of duplica-
tion and redundancy in operations.[58]
Economies of scope occur when the cost of producing
two (or more) products jointly is less that the cost of produc-
ing a single product.[59] Such economies can be achieved
by the alliance members when they link up their existing
route networks so that they are able to provide connecting
services for new markets, and where marketing costs can be
shared amongst alliance partners [60] that may have strong
entrenched positions in certain air travel markets.[43]
An important motivator for alliance participation is the
benefit to be derived from economies of learning (or experience).[61]
Incumbent suppliers possess more information on the market
being served and can therefore tailor their services to sat-
isfy specific customer requirements. New entrants, however,
would be required to commit resources to acquire such infor-
mation in order to capture market share, but alliances enable
the information to be gained from existing suppliers.[43]
2.4.5 Access to assets, resources and competencies
Specific resources, skills or competency inadequacy or imbal-
ance can be addressed by an airline by allying with partners
who have a different set of such skills and can therefore com-
pensate for their partner airlines internal deficiencies. The air
transport industry regulatory framework based on bilateral air
services agreements (ASA’s) and take-off and landing slots
and congestion at certain airports located around the world,
mean that airlines possessing licenses or authority to operate
services on a route and hold slots at a congested airport have
important and marketable assets that are attractive to alliance
partners [43]. Alliances can therefore provide relatively easy
access to a route [56] by permitting access to a partner’s assets
which may have been established over prolonged periods and
which may have enjoyed government intervention.[43]
2.4.6 Maintain a market presence
Strategic alliances assist airlines to maintain market presence
in markets where the specific characteristics and growth poten-
tial would render the single operation of an airline unprofitable.[62]
2.4.7 Risk sharing
Strategic alliances are viewed as an attractive mechanism for
hedging or mitigating risk. This is because neither partner
bears the full risk and cost of the alliance activity.[63, 64]
Developing new or air existing routes, for example, becomes
considerably less risky if the airline partners have firmly en-
trenched marketing strengths in the two markets at either end
of the routes.[43, 56]
2.4.8 The use of strategic alliances to help shape the mar-
ket
This is critical to understanding strategic airline alliances.
Overcapacity is often an acknowledged airline industry prob-
lem; one solution being to reduce the number of airlines. By
collaborating through a strategic alliance, airlines are, in ef-
fect, reducing the level of competition.[55] Strategic alliances
may, therefore, be used by airlines as a defensive strategy
to reduce the level of competition since an advantage of an
alliance is converting a competitor into a partner. Smaller, rel-
atively weak airlines may regard alliances as the only viable
means in which to compete against larger more sophisticated
rivals.[43] On the other hand, strategic alliance formation may
form part of an offensive strategy, by linking with a competi-
tor, for example, in order to place pressure on the profits and
market share of a common rival.[65]
2.5 Porters Five Forces Model
Before a firm can define and implement its business level
strategy, it must be fully cognizant of what forces will in-
fluence profits in the industry.[66] Porter [67, 68] has pro-
vided a dynamic and focused analytical framework – Porter’s
Five Forces Model – for determining the level of competition
present in an industry. Porter notes that there are five forces
that determine the attractiveness of an industry as well as the
long-run industry profitability: threat of entry by potential new
market entrants, the threat of substitutes, the bargaining power
of buyers, the bargaining power of suppliers, and the intensity
of rivalry between existing competitors (Figure 2).[67, 68, 69]
The collective strength of these five forces will determine the
limit of an industry’s profit potential.[70]
2.5.1 Risk of entry by potential competitors
Porter [68] has noted that “new entrants to an industry bring
new capacity, the desire to gain market share, and often sub-
stantial resources. In some industries there are high barriers
to market entry whereas other industry’s may be quite easy
to enter.[69] The six key barriers to market entry include
economies of scale, product differentiation, capital require-
ments, cost disadvantages independent of size, access to dis-
tribution channels, and government policy [68].
2.5.2 Threat of substitutes
The presence of substitute products can lower the potential
of an industry [68] as well profitability because they restrict
price levels.[69] According to Uc¸mak and Arslan [69], the
threat of substitutes is dependent upon the buyers’ willingness
to substitute products, the relative price, and performance of
the substitute product, and the switching costs to substitutes.
2.5.3 Bargaining power of buyers
Buyers may be individuals or firms that purchase the output of
an industry.[70] A buyer group is regarded as powerful when
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Figure 2. Porter’s Five Forces model. Source: adapted from
[71]
it concentrated or when a buyer purchases in large quantities,
products are standardized, it earns low profits, the industry’s
product is regarded as unimportant to the quality of the buyers’
product or services, the product(s) produced by the industry
do not save the buyer money, and buyers threaten to integrate
backwards into an industry [69].
2.5.4 Bargaining power of suppliers
Suppliers are firms that supply materials and other products
into an industry [69]. The cost of items purchased from a sup-
plier may have a substantial impact on the firm’s profitability.
In cases where suppliers possess high bargaining power over a
buyer, then in theory, the firm’s industry is less attractive.[69]
The bargaining power of suppliers will be high when there
are many buyers and few dominant suppliers, there are undif-
ferentiated, highly valued products, suppliers pose a credible
threat of integrating into the industry, and the industry is not a
customer of the supplier group.[68, 69]
2.5.5 Intensity of rivalry among established firms
The rivalry of the firms competing in an existing market can
also influence industry profitability.[71] Incumbents compet-
ing in the industry use tactics including price competition,
product introduction, advertising campaigns, and higher lev-
els of customer service. The intensity of rivalry is greatest in
the presence of the following conditions:
• Numerous competitors or equally powerful competitors
competing in the industry;
• Slow industry growth levels;
• There are high fixed but marginal costs;
• Lack of differentiation or switching costs;
• Capacity is typically introduced in large increments;
and
• High market exit barriers [72].
3. Research approach
3.1 Research approach
The research approach in this paper was based on the use of
an instrumental case study approach.[73] Creswell [74] notes
that in an “instrumental case study, the researcher focuses
on an issue or concern, and then selects one bounded case to
illustrate this issue”. Accordingly, an instrumental case study
is the study of a case, for example, a firm, that provides in-
sights into a specific issue, redraws generalizations, or builds
theory.[75, 76] The present study was designed around the
established theory of strategic alliances and joint ventures.
The key issue examined in the present study was the develop-
ment and evolution of the strategic transatlantic joint venture
between Air France-KLM, Delta Airlines and Virgin Atlantic
Airways. Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines and Virgin At-
lantic Airways were thus the study’s case companies.
The research undertaken in the present study used a qual-
itative case study research design.[73, 76] The goal of this
approach is to expand and build theories rather than perform
statistical analysis to test a study’s specific hypothesis.[77]
3.2 Data collection
Data for the study was obtained from a range of documents,
company materials available on the internet, airline industry
press articles, press releases, and records. These documents
provided the sources of case evidence. The documents col-
lected and examined in the study included press releases, and
the Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines, KLM Royal Dutch Air-
lines, and Virgin Atlantic Airways websites. An exhaustive
source of the air transport-related magazines – Air Transport
World, Airline Business, Aviation Week and Space Technol-
ogy and Flight International was also conducted. These airline
industry-based publications were accessed in the Proquest
ABI/INFORM and EBSCO Information Sources databases. A
search of the SCOPUS and Google Scholar databases was also
undertaken in the present study. The key words used in the
database searches included “Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines,
and Virgin Atlantic Airways transatlantic joint venture”, “syn-
ergistic benefits of the Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines, and
Virgin Atlantic Airways transatlantic joint venture ”, “joint
venture partner airline route networks ”, “joint sharing of costs
and revenues”, “competitive position of the Air France-KLM,
Delta Air Lines and Virgin Atlantic Airways joint venture”,
“airline joint venture route network development”, value cap-
tured and delivered by the Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines,
and Virgin Atlantic Airways transatlantic joint venture”, “evo-
lution of the Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines, and Virgin
Atlantic Airways transatlantic joint venture”.
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The study used secondary data. The study followed the
three principles of data collection as suggested by Yin [78]:
the use of multiple sources of case evidence, creation of a
database on the subject and the establishment of a chain of
evidence.
3.3 Data analysis process
The empirical data collected for the case studies was exam-
ined using document analysis.[76, 79] Document analysis
is quite frequently used in case studies and focuses on the
information and data from formal documents and company
records that were gathered in the study.[80, 81, 82] The docu-
ments collected for the present study were examined by four
key criteria: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and
meaning.[83, 84]
Before proceeding with the formal analysis of the docu-
ments that were gathered for the study, the context in which
the documents were created was determined and the authentic-
ity of the documents was carefully assessed.[83] Authenticity
entails an assessment of the gathered documents for their
soundness and authorship. According to Scott and Marshall
[83], “soundness refers to whether the document is complete
and whether it is an original and sound copy”. Authorship
relates to such issues as collective or institutional authorship.
In this study the source of the case study documents was pri-
marily from Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines and Virgin
Atlantic Airways media releases as well as relevant articles
published in the leading air transport industry-related maga-
zines: Air Transport World, Airline Business, Aviation Week
and Space Technology, and Flight International. The docu-
ments collected in the study were all readily available in the
public domain. The credibility criterion concerns the accuracy
and sincerity of a document.[83, 84, 85] In the present study,
the evidence for the case study was corroborated using various
kinds of documents that were sourced from various sources,
for example, company news releases, articles publishing in the
leading air transport industry magazines, and relevant articles
published on the Internet.[86]
The representativeness criterion involved an assessment
of the availability and survival of the documents that were
collected for the study. No major difficulties were experienced
in obtaining the documents as all the relevant documents
could be easily accessed in the public domain. The fourth
criterion, meaning, is a very important aspect of document
analysis. Meaning occurs at two levels. The first is the literal
understanding of a document, that is, its physical readability,
the language used, whether it can be read, and the date of
the document. [83] When conducting document analysis in
a study, it is important for the researcher(s) to interpret the
understanding and the context within which the document
was produced. This enables the researcher(s) to subsequently
interpret the meaning of the document. The evidence found in
the documents collected and used for the present study were
all clear and comprehensible.
The document analysis process in the study was under-
taken in six distinct phases which followed the recommenda-
tions of O’Leary [87]:
• Phase 1: This phase involved planning the types and
required documentation and their availability;
• Phase 2: The data collection involved gathering the
documents and developing and implementing a scheme
for the document management;
• Phase 3: Documents were reviewed to assess their au-
thenticity, credibility and to identify any potential bias;
• Phase 4: The content of the collected documents was
interrogated, and the key themes and issues were identi-
fied;
• Phase 5: This phase involved the reflection and refine-
ment to identify and difficulties associated with the
documents, reviewing sources, as well as exploring the
documents content; and
• Phase 6: The analysis of the data was completed in this
final phase of the study [87].
The documents gathered for the study covered the period
1989 to 2018, that is, the documents covered the period from
the inception of the Air France and Northwest Airlines joint
venture which formed the roots of the subsequent transatlantic
joint venture between Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines, and
Virgin Atlantic Airways through to the present time of the
study.
Following the guidance of Yin [78], all the collected doc-
uments were downloaded and stored in a case study database.
The documents collected for the study were all in English.
Each document was carefully read, and key themes were
coded and recorded. This study also followed the recommen-
dation of van Schoor [86], who has noted that in order to
avoid bias, documents from different sources should also be
carefully analyzed in the study. In addition, triangulation was
employed to add discipline to the study. This was achieved by
collecting documents from multiple sources. This approach
helped verify the themes that were detected in the documents
collected in the study. [76, 79]
4. Case Study Results
4.1 The evolution of the Air France-KLM, Delta Air
Lines and Virgin Atlantic Airways Joint Venture
The origins of the Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines, and
Virgin Atlantic Airways Joint Venture date back to 1989 when
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines ratified a pioneering agreement
with United States-based Northwest Airlines.[88] This agree-
ment followed the anti-trust immunity granted to the two
airlines by the United States Department of Transportation
(DOT) in 1993.[89] This alliance agreement was also facil-
itated following the signing of an “Open Skies” agreement
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between the United States and the Netherlands.[90] An “open
skies” agreement is a type of air services agreement (ASA) in
which the contracting parties exchange freedoms of the air in a
liberal and generous manner.[91] Anti-trust immunity means
that the two partner airlines were authorized to operate their
trans-Atlantic flights as a joint venture in relation to pricing,
flight scheduling, product development, and marketing. In
August 1997, Northwest Airlines committed itself to a further
13 year “enhanced alliance agreement” with KLM [89]. This
alliance was often referred to as the “Wings” Alliance, and
this was the airline industry’s oldest airline pair alliance.[92]
In 1999, Air France and Delta Air Lines formed the “Sky
Team” global alliance.[9, 93] In 2001, Aeromexico, Alitalia,
CSA Czech Airlines and Korean Air joined the alliance. Con-
tinental Airlines, KLM, and Northwest subsequently joined
the alliance in 2004.[9]
As previously noted, Air France acquired KLM in 2004.
In 2003, Air France paid e784 million for KLM, through a
complex share swap which effectively resulted in the privati-
zation of the French flag carrier. Following its offer to acquire
KLM, the French governments shareholding fell to 44%, with
other Air France investors holding 37%, with the remaining
19% of the combined group held by KLM shareholders.[94]
Air France’s takeover of KLM was completed in early May
2004, with approximately 90% of KLM’s shareholders giv-
ing their approval for the deal.[95] The pan-European vision
included a dual-hub philosophy based on Paris Charles de
Gaulle and Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airports [96].
In October 2006, Air France and Delta Air Lines signed a
joint venture agreement that covered the transatlantic services.[97]
The 50-50 joint venture shared revenue and cost on the two
partners transatlantic operations.[98] The agreement was like
the groundbreaking joint venture agreement between KLM
and Northwest Airlines that commenced in 1993. Air France
and Delta Air Lines predicted that their joint venture would
produce around $USD 1.5 billion in annual revenue during
the first phase, which covered flights from Delta Air Lines
US hubs to London Heathrow Airport, Lyon and Paris, in the
second phase of the joint venture agreement, the two part-
ners projected more than $ USD 8 billion in annual revenues
[97, 98] In Phase 2, the agreement was extended to include
all the partner’s transatlantic flights. In addition, the two part-
ners foresaw new routes being launched as part of joint ven-
ture agreement, including London Heathrow Airport to Los
Angeles.[96] The first phase of the agreement commenced
in April 2008 and concluded in March 2010. The second
phase of the agreement commenced in April 2010. The joint
venture agreement covered all transatlantic flights operated
by Air France and Delta Air Lines between Europe and the
Mediterranean on one side and the United States, Canada, and
Mexico on the other as well as flights between Los Angeles
and Tahiti, French Polynesia. [97, 98]
During early 2008, KLM and Northwest Airlines ex-
panded their highly profitable transatlantic joint venture to
include three new routes from London Heathrow Airport. The
new routes were made possible following the conclusion of
the European Union-United States “Open Skies” agreement.
Two days prior to the celebration of the 10th anniversary cele-
brating the tenth anniversary of their joint venture, Northwest
Airlines announced plans to launch new services by mid-2008
from London Heathrow Airport to Detroit, Minneapolis, and
Seattle using six slots leased from KLM. [99] An airport slot
is “most commonly known as a aircraft landing or aircraft
take-off right during a specified period of time”. [100]
In early 2009, Air France-KLM acquired a 25% sharehold-
ing in Alitalia. [101, 102] The investment by Air France-KLM
in Alitalia was to be complemented through joint market-
ing and cooperation on routes, especially between Italy and
France and between Italy and the Netherlands. [103]
Air France and Delta Air Lines established a joint venture
on October 17, 2007, which was due to be implemented on
1 April 2008. The joint venture included all routes between
their hubs, as well services from London-Heathrow Airport.
On May 20th, 2009, Air France-KLM and Delta Air Lines
formally signed a joint venture agreement involving joint
operations and the sharing of revenues and costs on their
transatlantic routes. [104]
On October 29, 2009, Delta Air Lines acquired Northwest
Airlines in a $USD 2.6 billion merger that created the world’s
largest airline. An ambitious plan following the takeover
was to link the long-established strength of Northwest Air-
lines throughout Asia with Delta’s expanding overseas net-
work, whilst also leveraging the benefits from the transatlantic
SkyTeam alliance that included Air France-KLM.. [105]
On July 5th, 2010, Alitalia joined the Air France-KLM
Group and Delta Air Lines as a member of the trans-Atlantic
joint venture. Launched in April 2009, the Air France-KLM
Group and Delta Air Lines multi-party agreement created a
single, coordinated network for passengers flying across the
Atlantic. The joint venture allowed the partner airlines to share
revenues and costs on their trans-Atlantic routes. Through
the four-airline joint venture, passengers were offered conve-
nient access to the world’s largest trans-Atlantic network. The
airlines offered almost 250 flights and approximately 55,000
seats each day. With the addition of Alitalia, the joint venture
accounted for approximately 26% of total transatlantic capac-
ity, with annual revenues estimated at more than $USD 10
billion. Alitalia’s home base at Rome joined Amsterdam, At-
lanta, Detroit, Minneapolis, New York-JFK and Paris-Charles
de Gaulle airports as the core hubs of the joint venture. Addi-
tional trans-Atlantic services were operated from Cincinnati,
Milan Malpensa, Memphis, and Salt Lake City. Wherever
traffic rights permitted, the partners offered customers code-
share services between the United States and the European
Union. In in many instances the service is beyond the key
hubs, creating a single network for seamless airline-to-airline
connections between points in North America and the Eu-
ropean Union. Governance of the joint venture was to be
equally shared between Alitalia, the Air France-KLM Group
and Delta Air Lines. Alitalia representatives immediately
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joined the joint venture’s 11 working groups responsible for
implementing and managing the agreement in the areas of
network, revenue management, sales, product, frequent flyer,
advertising/brand, cargo, operations, information technology,
communications and finance. Alitalia was also included in all
joint venture initiatives, including joint sales contracts, which
launched in January 2009. Alitalia’s addition to the joint ven-
ture became effective on April 1, 2010 as part of a long-term
agreement effective until at least March 31, 2022. [106, 107]
As noted earlier, Delta Air Lines purchased Singapore
Airlines 49% share-holding in Virgin Atlantic Airways in
2012. Following the acquisition of its stake in Virgin At-
lantic Airways, Delta filed with the regulatory authorities for
anti-trust immunity on Virgin Atlantic Airways transatlantic
routes. The partnership was separate to Delta Air Lines exist-
ing transatlantic joint venture partners Air France-KLM, and
Alitalia. According to the anti-trust immunity application with
the United States Department of Transportation (DOT), Delta
and Virgin Atlantic Airways would coordinate with these air-
lines on traffic flows across the Atlantic. The partners stated
that following the granting of immunity approval, the carri-
ers would launch a new service between London Heathrow
Airport and Seattle. Seattle was a growing focus city for
Delta Air Lines. In addition, the partners would add new
services between London and Delta’s Salt Lake City hub, as
well as additional frequencies between London and Boston,
Detroit, and Newark Airports. [108] The United States De-
partment of Transportation (DOT) tentatively approved the
alliance between Delta and Virgin Atlantic Airways. Under
the joint venture arrangements Delta Air Lines and Virgin
Atlantic Airways planned to coordinate on network planning,
pricing, sales, as well as other functions through the metal
neutral joint venture, which included revenue and profit shar-
ing. [109] In mid-2017, Delta Air Lines, Air France-KLM and
Virgin Atlantic Airways sought closer ties and these carriers
decided to form a broader and longer term transatlantic joint
venture between the airlines. Delta Air Lines purchased a 10%
stake in Air France-KLM, and Air France-KLM purchased
a 31% stake in Virgin Atlantic. [110, 111] The combined
joint venture was designed to strengthen the partner airlines
transatlantic route network as the airlines continued to bat-
tle for market share with the low-cost carriers (LCCs) [112].
Under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that was
signed by Delta Air Lines, Air France-KLM and Virgin At-
lantic, the carriers were to apply for the regulatory approval to
combine the existing Delta-Virgin Atlantic joint venture and
the joint venture between Delta Air Lines, Air France-KLM
and Alitalia into a unified joint venture. [110]
On May 15, 2018 Air France-KLM, Delta Airlines and
Virgin Atlantic Airways signed definitive agreements that
paved the way forward for the airlines expanded transatlantic
joint venture. The formal agreement signed between three
airlines established the governance as well as the commercial
and operational terms of the expanded joint venture. Upon
completion of the agreement, Air France-KLM would acquire
the 31% stake held by the Virgin Group, valued at £220 mil-
lion. The Virgin Group still held a 20% stakes and Delta
Air Line retained its 49% stake in Virgin Atlantic Airways.
[113] In addition, Delta Air Lines and China Eastern Air-
lines each acquired an 10% shareholding in Air France-KLM.
[114, 115] Air France-KLM, Delta and Virgin Atlantic would
also coordinate their efforts to secure the appropriate regula-
tory approvals. [113, 116] The expanded joint venture, with
Alitalia included, offered around 300 nonstop transatlantic
flights per day as well as convenient flight schedules. [117] An
important element of the new joint venture agreement was that
it bought Virgin Atlantic Airways into the SkyTeam alliance
joint venture fold. The inclusion of Virgin Atlantic Airways
allowed Air France-KLM to profit from more nonstop connec-
tivity from London Heathrow and London Gatwick airports
to the United States. [118]
The combination of the existing joint ventures of, firstly,
Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines and Alitalia, and secondly,
the Delta Air Lines and Virgin Atlantic Airways, within a
unified joint venture framework marked the expansion and
reinforcement of one of the world airline industry most ad-
vanced partnership models. The joint venture will enable the
partners to:
• Provide customers with an unrivalled value proposition
on transatlantic air routes;
• Drive the capacity growth of the airlines;
• Create an associate partner status which would enable
the inclusion of other potential partners;
• Extend a partnership over a 15-year time period [115];
• The new joint venture arrangements will have the most
comprehensive route network;
• Competitive fares and frequent flyer benefits;
• Customers are also able to benefit from the co-location
of facilities at key hubs to improve connectivity as well
as being granted access to each partner’s airport lounges
(for premium passengers) [113]; and
• Generate significant annual synergies due to a new code
share to/from London, sales coordination, the extended
partnership, and cost savings. [115]
Uncertainty surrounded Alitalia, which filed for extraor-
dinary administration in early 2017 and was not amongst the
partners announcing the enhanced joint venture. [114] Al-
italia was dropped from the joint venture pact and was not
included in the joint venture application filed by Air France-
KLM, Delta Air Lines, and Virgin Atlantic Airways with the
United States authorities on 20 July 2018, with the partner
airlines citing Alitalia’s ongoing restructuring for the move.
[119]
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4.2 The application of Porter’s Five Forces Model to
the Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines and Virgin
Atlantic Airways joint venture
The attractiveness of the world air travel market is determined
by the five major forces. The rivalry amongst the incumbent
competitors (central driving force), the bargaining power of
buyers, the bargaining power of suppliers, the threat of new
entrants into the industry (limitations of market entry), and
the threat of substitute products or services. [67, 68]
4.2.1 Intensity of rivalry among established firms in the
transatlantic air travel market
There is extremely intense rivalry present in the airline in-
dustry. There are a range of economic characteristics that
influence and drive the intensive rivalry within the airline
industry:
• Perishable product: the airline product is intangible
in nature, which is instantly perishable and cannot be
stored. [90] The transportation capacity is only avail-
able for a period and disappears once the aircraft de-
parts on its assigned flight. Costs for providing capacity
are hence largely sunk costs in the short-term. This
produces severe pressure on price discounting. [120]
Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines, and Virgin Atlantic
Airways all offer both premium (business) and leisure
travel classes on their aircraft. This strategy enables
them to capture value from these two discrete market
segments.
• Similar products: within a service class, the airline prod-
uct is homogenous in nature, and thus, the product is
highly similar across airlines. [53, 120, 121] The Inter-
national Air Transport Association [120] notes “that the
core transportation service is not differentiated across
airlines, at least not within the broad types of airlines
(full service network airlines, low-cost airlines)”. Fur-
thermore, new product initiatives are rapidly copied
by competitors. [120] Virgin Atlantic Airways, for
example, has endeavored to differentiate its premium
passenger service offering by providing its “upper class”
(business) passengers with a chauffeur service – this
enhances the airline’s value offering.
• Low marginal cost structure: in the airline industry, high
fixed costs exist at the individual airline level. [120] In
addition, marginal costs for additional passengers are
quite low [53], and this reinforces price discounting by
airlines. The International Air Transport Association
[120], has observed “that the variable costs per aircraft,
however, are significant and have increased as jet fuel
prices have risen over the past few years”. Jet fuel
prices are one of the largest costs for Air France-KLM,
Delta Air Lines, and Virgin Atlantic Airways.
• Significant exit barriers: in the airline industry, air-
craft capacity typically remains in the market, and only
disappears in the very long run, even when specific
airlines may leave the market. Also, aircraft can be
transferred to another geographical market quite eas-
ily. Airport infrastructure (boarding gates, airport slots)
never fully disappears and can be returned to service
at low marginal cost, even if these assets are left idle
for some time. In an average year, less than 1% of
airlines exit the market. There are a number of barriers
that restrict the ability of an airline to reduce overall
capacity on specific routes: first, airlines are forced to
incur a capital loss if they decide to sell aircraft during
an industry downturn; second, the gradual reduction of
aircraft capacity in reaction to slumps in both passenger
and air cargo demand is complicated by the require-
ment to retire capacity by aircraft, not by seat; third,
use-it-or-lose-it rules and regulations on airport slots
creates barriers to exit from air routes; fourth, the full
service network carrier (FSNC) business model means
that lost traffic from an existing city pair or service can
have a flow-on effect on the economics in other parts of
the airline’s route network; and fifth, reducing capacity
in a market by operating smaller aircraft on specific
services increases the average cost per ASK [120].
• Capacity: incremental capacity may be required for
one of both of two purposes; growth within the exist-
ing route network – the aircraft acquisition could be
necessary to accommodate traffic growth that has been
come from either or both an expanding market or an in-
creased market share; and new capacity may be required
to satisfy new missions, for example, the operation of
ultra-long haul services [121]. The capacity added by a
single aircraft is typically higher than the demand aris-
ing from the addition of one new connection.[120] In
addition, new airport infrastructure generally becomes
available many years after an investment decision has
been made.
• Industry growth: the airline industry growth has been
rapid but volatile and highly heterogenous across ge-
ographies. This volatility has resulted in repeated short
periods of profitability, even during times when the
average returns have been low. [120]
• Heterogeneity of firms; in individual air travel mar-
kets, airlines tend to be in more heterogenous positions.
While the market for an airline between two origin-and-
destinations (O & Ds) or city pairs may be the core
market for an airline that provides direct services, it
is often a marginal market for another airline, which
is providing the service through a transfer connection
at its hub. Between such heterogenous competitors
the ability to avoid deep price competition is less likely.
The International Air Transport Association [120], have
noted that “airlines are exposed to the specific policy
context in their home markets”. When they compete
internationally, they compete against rivals operating
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under different conditions. This can impact the com-
petitive interaction between the two airlines in ways
unrelated to underlying efficiency or value proposition.
In addition, airlines often confront different cost struc-
tures based on the period they have been in business,
and hence, different economic incentives. Over time,
labor cost tends to increase and the pressure to expand
forces airlines to increase the complexity of their opera-
tions [120]. The transatlantic market is served by both
full-service network carriers, such as Air France-KLM,
Delta Air Lines and Virgin Atlantic and the low-cost car-
riers, for example, Norwegian Air Shuttle or WOW Air.
Norwegian Air Shuttle or WOW Air primarily compete
based on price, offering low fares, which are offset by
ancillary revenues, for instance, baggage fees. In con-
trast, American Airlines, British Airways, Lufthansa,
SWISS International Airlines, and United Airlines, the
key competitors to Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines,
and Virgin Atlantic Airways on the transatlantic, all
offer customers connections via their respective hub
airports. Furthermore, these airlines will have differing
cost bases to that of Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines,
and Virgin Atlantic Airways.
Overall the intensity of rivalry amongst incumbents com-
peting in the airline industry is high.
4.2.2 Risk of market entry by potential competitors
The threat of new entrants in the airline industry is high. Over
the past four decades, 1,300 new airlines were established, on
average around 30 per rear (excluding those operating non-
Western built jet aircraft). However, the entry of new airlines
into the industry has been quite cyclical. Nonetheless, airlines
enter the market quite regularly, principally through exist-
ing airlines expanding their services to new markets (carrier-
within-carrier strategy). The simple threat of entry by a poten-
tial competitor to the industry, appears to have limited impact.
Prices reduce following entry, but not in anticipation nor to
deter entry. Entry barriers do play some role for the new en-
trants but are viewed as being very low for incumbent airlines
[120].
The barriers to entry are high due to the following factors:
• Economies of scale are present on the demand side, that
is, it is easier for airlines to generate demand with a
strong brand, an extensive distribution presence, and
a large route offering many connections. [120] Fur-
thermore, an incumbent’s hub-and-spoke operations
increase their effectiveness by being undertaken on a
substantial scale. Thus, it can very difficult for small
new entrants to break in to the industry. In point-to-
point (P2P) air travel markets, no such protection for
the incumbents is in existence. [90]
• Supply-side economies of scale are limited should an
airline grow beyond a level of approximately 50 aircraft.
This creates some disadvantages for new entrants but
not for incumbent carriers looking to expand into new
markets. Because the addition of new capacity is lumpy
in nature, airlines operating in adjacent geographies
confront the lowest entry barriers. This is because they
can serve a new destination through spare capacity on
existing aircraft. [120]
• Access to product distribution channels is quite easy for
new entrants. Global distribution systems (GDSs) and
the internet now enable new airlines to list and make
their flights available for sale through a larger number
of aggregator websites and travel agencies. [120, 122]
Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines, and Virgin Atlantic
Airways services are readily available through aggrega-
tor websites, such as, Expedia.
• Legacy rights on airport slots provide some advan-
tages. [120] In cases where airport slots continue to
be awarded under the “Grand Father” rights principle, it
will be most difficult for new entrants to obtain access to
attractively-timed slots at congested airports. [90] How-
ever, there is secondary trading of slots at congested
airports [123], and hence, there are no advantages until
slot capacity is reached. If infrastructure does not grow
in the accordance with travel volumes, however, it can
become an increasing bottleneck restricting entry at the
most highly frequented hub airports. [120]
• A considerable amount of capital is required to pur-
chase and acquire new aircraft. [120] Prior to the
global financial crisis (GFC), however, external finance
was widely available from several sources including in-
vestors, banks, and aircraft manufacturers. In addition,
the growing prominence of the aircraft leasing firms
reduces capital requirements. However, it remains quite
difficult for new entrants to satisfy the operational cash
flow requirements through persistent industry down-
turns. [120]
• In the airline industry, customer switching costs are low.
[120, 124]
• Government policies to defend the position of the exist-
ing national flag carrier were historically quite impor-
tant but, in most markets, now are no longer important.
The situation, however, is different in some emerging
markets, where entry to the industry does occur but only
in ways that are sanctioned by government [120].
• Staff resources – particularly pilots and aircraft tech-
nicians – are also important. During downturns or re-
cessionary periods many trained people will have the
misfortune of being made redundant, and thus, may
be well prepared to secure new roles at relatively low
salaries and wages in order to secure their employment.
[90]
Overall the threats of new entrants into the airline industry
is high.
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4.2.3 Bargaining power of buyers
According to the International Air Transport Association
[120], “the bargaining power of airline customers is high
and rising”. Buyers are primarily comprised of individuals
and corporations [124]. The purchasers of corporate travel,
including government agencies and corporate travel agencies
who purchase airline tickets in bulk, possess substantial bar-
gaining power and use their significant bargaining power and
purchasing leverage to obtain lower prices. Individual passen-
gers do not possess such leverage, but they do benefit from
full information, lower switching costs, often have a large
variety of airlines to choose from their air travel requirements,
and limited differentiation. Specifically, with the growth in
the size of the Internet, individuals can obtain full pricing
information by searching the websites of airlines and the on-
line travel firms, for example, Expedia. Whilst, airlines can
utilize frequent flyer programs and advertising to promote
switching costs and differentiation, customers for the most
part confront very low switching costs and have the option
to choose amongst many airlines that essentially provide the
same service. [124] Customer loyalty to specific airlines may
be relatively low, but frequent flyers often react to the incen-
tives offered in customer-loyalty programs. [120] For instance,
some airlines have a frequent flyer program that rewards cus-
tomers who have flown a specified number of miles. [125] Air
France-KLM, Delta Air Lines, and Virgin Atlantic Airways
offer comprehensive frequent flyer programs.
Customer buying power is driven by a set of underlying
factors:
• Aggregator websites: Aggregator websites have consol-
idated consumers’ purchasing power. Websites focus
on price comparison and, as previously noted, increases
the transparency of prices across airlines. The global
distribution systems (GDSs) have made it quite easy for
new aggregator websites to enter the market [120]. Air
France-KLM, Delta Air Lines and Virgin Atlantic use a
GDS as part of their product/service offering distribu-
tion system.
• Travel agents: travel agents now often represent the
entire demand for large corporations, with significant
power to move demand across airlines. Notwithstand-
ing, travel agents need to comply with corporate travel
policies that have become more price oriented [120].
Air France-KLM, Delta Airlines, and Virgin Atlantic
Airways also utilize travel agents as a key part of their
product/service offering distribution system.
• Business travelers: flight frequency is a key differen-
tiator between airlines of a similar type on a given
service. [90, 120, 121] Airlines have endeavored to
create switching costs, but these are primarily mean-
ingful for business travelers. Loyalty programs create
switching costs through the expiration and inflation of
frequent flyer miles (or points) that creates incentives
for the member(s) to use miles/points to remain loyal to
a given airline/alliance but reduce their value. [120] Air
France-KLM, Delta Air Lines, and Virgin Atlantic Air-
ways each have a frequent flyer scheme that has been
carefully designed to reward customer loyalty. The part-
ner airlines place a very high focus on the premium
air travel market segment, and thus, attempt to retain
the premium passengers through the frequent flyer pro-
grams.
• Leisure travelers: as noted, individual leisure travelers
almost entirely select an airline based on price, and
often have a low willingness to pay (WTP) for shorter
travel time or airline-specific services. [120] Air France-
KLM, Delta Air Lines, and Virgin Atlantic Airways
have a leisure travel product, which is stimulated and
optimized through pricing initiatives, frequent flyer ben-
efits, and marketing and advertising campaigns.
Overall the level of bargaining power of buyers in the
airline industry is regarded as high.
4.2.4 Bargaining power of suppliers
In the airline industry, the bargaining power of suppliers is
high for some critical inputs. As a group, the suppliers capture
higher returns on capital (ROC) than the airlines themselves.
• Airframe and aircraft engine manufacturers: On a global
basis, airframe and aircraft engine manufacturing is
highly concentrated, and thus, these suppliers possess
high bargaining power. The level of switching costs
between airframes and aircraft engines is moderate. For
airlines, there are some fixed costs associated with the
introduction of a new aircraft/engine type to its fleet.
For new aircraft, the time lag between the placement of
the order and production creates some switching barri-
ers. The airframe manufacturers have important, and
significant, alternative markets, particularly so for the
market for defense equipment [120]. Furthermore, the
aircraft manufacturers enjoy considerable bargaining
power as there are many airlines but only two major air-
craft manufacturer’s – Airbus and Boeing Commercial
Airplanes- and two regional jet manufacturers – Bom-
bardier and Embraer. [124] Air France-KLM, Delta Air
Lines, and Virgin Atlantic Airways have long-standing
and valued relationships with Airbus and Boeing, which
helps mitigates possible supplier power.
• Labor: airlines are highly dependent upon their skilled
workforce, particularly pilots and technical staff. The
full-service network airlines (FSNCs) are especially
vulnerable to disruptions at their hub airports. This
vulnerability raises the power of unions at these loca-
tions. For other services, like station/ground handling
services, general administration, outsourcing is an al-
ternative that has been widely used in the industry. In
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the airline industry, unions often tend to be local mo-
nopolies. Furthermore, within airlines there are typi-
cally different unions for different types of personnel,
with each having the ability to disrupt the airline’s op-
erations. In the airline industry, there are substantial
cost differences between new entrants, airlines that are
in bankruptcy protection, and unionized incumbents,
where high wages and salaries are paid to employees
that possess specialized skills, such as pilots. Airline
employees remain powerful where labor regulations
and the airline’s hub-and-spoke route network system
provides them with critical leverage. In addition, the In-
ternational Air Transport Association [120], notes that
“because union power often rises as companies mature,
the nature of labor relations also erodes industry struc-
ture by encouraging entry (and bankruptcy) to avoid
union-related costs, even if there is no productivity ad-
vantage”.
• Airports: many local airports are monopolies [126, 127]
that do not confront significant competition from nearby
secondary airports. [120] There is limited entry by
new airports, consequently, the main restraint on the
exploitation of market power is through economic reg-
ulation or, to a lesser degree, competition policy. The
pricing power that the local monopoly provides to an
airport is significantly dependent upon the potential traf-
fic to which it provides access [120]. Airport switching
costs are high [128], particularly for the full-service
network carriers (FSNCs) that are focused on providing
connections for their customers. [120] The Air France-
KLM, Delta Air Lines, and Virgin Atlantic Airways
route network is based on the hub-and-spoke route net-
work design, where peripheral spoke cities are linked
to the respective hub airports. Delta Air Lines operates
multiple hubs, with its primary hub being Atlanta. The
primary hub for Air France is Paris Charles de Gaulle,
whilst Virgin Atlantic’s key hubs are London Heathrow
and London Gatwick Airports. Due their scales and
long historical business relationships, these airlines ap-
pear to enjoy a close and productive relationship with
the airport operators.
• Airport ground handling and catering services: In gen-
eral, airport operations include aircraft ground han-
dling/baggage handling and passenger terminal oper-
ations. Ground handling can be divided into terminal
area and airside area operations. The main duty of the
airport terminal area is passenger handling; the main
duty of airside is the ramp service of an aircraft. [128]
In the airline industry, ground handling agents often
operate as local monopolies or oligopolies. Airlines are
often the dominant or only buyers of ground handling
services provided by these firms. The ground handling
agents’ services are typically homogenous and there are
many potential entrants outside of the industry with the
requisite skills. The switching costs for an airline seek-
ing to change (or consider) a ground handling agents
services are small. The primary barrier to market entry
is regulation that provides ground handling agents with
local monopoly rights. Many airlines perform their own
ground handling but the level of outsourcing of these
functions to independent handlers is anticipated to rise
significantly. A number of the smaller ground handling
agents belong to larger international groups. The In-
ternational Air Transport Association [120] notes that
“ground handling/catering providers have limited bar-
gaining power, largely because airlines have the option
of providing the service in-house”.
• Sources of financing: firms specializing in debt financ-
ing have many investment opportunities and can de-
mand finance terms that deliver solid returns consider-
ing the risks associated with the airline industry. The
providers of equity capital, often critical to survival
during periods of distress, can push for attractive condi-
tions. Considering the low overall market capitalization
of the airline industry, investors view equity positions
in airlines as being high risk. This is despite the high-
return opportunities [120].
• Air traffic control: the suppliers of air traffic control
(ATC) and airport services often have monopoly power,
and in such cases, airlines are required to pay whatever
ATC and airport service charges are levied upon them.
[90]
Overall the level of bargaining power of suppliers in the
airline industry is regarded as high.
4.2.5 Threat of substitutes
The International Air Transport Association [120], have ob-
served that “the most powerful substitute to aircraft travel is
not an alternative mode of transport, but the decision not to
travel” at all. This is especially the case for leisure travel-
ers that can allocate their discretionary expenditure on other
activities or purchases [120].
The threat to the airline industry from other substitutes
has in the past played a moderate role, but in recent times has
started to become more significant in some market segments.
The substitution is dependent upon the relative cost/benefit
profile of other transport modes and communication mediums
vis-a`-vis air transportation:
• Aircraft are still the fastest mode of transport and the
real cost of transport has declined significantly over the
past few decades or so. However, increased security
measures have influenced passenger processing times,
and this has had an impact on the overall attractive-
ness of scheduled airline transport relative to substitute
transport modes.
• The significant decline in the real cost of air travel has
increased the advantage of air travel versus substitutes,
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and further technological improvements are most likely
to be made [120].
• Airlines can also confront competition from surface-
based transport modes. [90] Thus, the development of
high-speed rail networks [129, 130], and the congestion
and environmental problems confronted by the air trans-
port industry suggest the railways could have a greater
role in working with the airlines to provide an integrated
transport service for medium-distance journeys (up to
800 km) [129]. Unlike airlines, railways can provide
city-centre to city-centre travel, and the use of rail has
been shown to severely influence the business travel
market once city-centre to city-centre rail journey times
can be brought down to less than three hours. [90]
In addition, a potential substitute threat is that of electronic
methods of communication on the market for business travel.
Video-conferencing, teleconferencing, and electronic mail (e-
mail) all have the potential to reduce the amount of business
travel, and their use may result in business travelers travelling
less, whilst also satisfying their requirements for effective
communication. [90]
Overall the threat of substitute products or services in the
airline industry is medium to high.
4.3 The strategic benefits for Air France-KLM, Delta
Air Lines and Virgin Atlantic Airways from their
joint venture
As noted earlier, joint ventures are formed by firms for a
variety of strategic reasons. [7, 9] Table 1 summarizes the
strategic benefits that the joint venture has provided to Air
France-KLM, Delta Air Lines, and Virgin Atlantic Airways
to date. As can be observed in Table 1, the transatlantic joint
venture is delivering a range of strategic benefits to the partner
airlines. These include synergistic benefits, the joint sharing of
revenue, coordination of flight schedules to optimize passen-
ger loads and passenger connectivity, enhancing the partner
airline’s position in the market, joint sharing of costs, and the
shared use of knowledge, competencies, and resources.
As previously noted, airlines are viewing joint ventures
as an ideal strategic option to better compete in the global
airline industry, and particularly, in the transatlantic air travel
market. Examples of other transatlantic joint ventures are the
British Airways, Iberia, American Airlines and Finnair joint
venture, and the Lufthansa, Austrian Airlines, Swiss, Brussels
Airlines, United Airlines, and Air Canada joint venture. [131]
These joint ventures have primarily focused on joint market-
ing, optimized flight schedules, enhanced route networks, and
code-sharing on one another’s aircraft. In addition to being
able to combine passenger reservations, ticketing, aircraft
maintenance, and financial reporting, partners have been able
to undertake joint route network planning, coordinate capacity
and pricing, as well as pooling revenues [9].
To date, the joint transatlantic venture between Air France-
KLM, Delta Air Lines, and Virgin Atlantic appears to have
been very successful and is underpinned by long-standing
business relationships between the joint venture partner air-
lines. Table 1 has shown that the joint venture has provided
the partners with a range of strategic benefits and has enabled
the joint venture partners to compete very effectively in both
the leisure and premium transatlantic air travel markets. As
noted earlier, airlines typically segregate the air travel mar-
ket into both premium (business) and leisure class travelers.
[53, 90, 132] The partners bring a range of complementary
resources and distinctive competencies to the joint venture,
and they appear to have very clearly identified objectives and
performance criteria. There has been a long period of favor-
able cooperation between the partner airlines. At the time
of the present study, Air France-KLM Delta Air Lines, and
Virgin Atlantic Airways were awaiting the final regulatory
approvals for the equity investments being made between the
partner airlines. There has been a very long history of fa-
vorable past cooperation in the transatlantic market between
the partners, but especially so between Air France-KLM and
Delta Air Lines. The transatlantic joint venture has provided
the partners with arrange of synergistic benefits and increased
efficiency measures, for example, the colocation of facilities,
enabling premium passengers to share the partner airline air-
port lounges. The partnership has also provided customers,
either premium or leisure, with a vast range of travel offerings
arising from the shared route networks between the partner
airlines.
The transatlantic air travel market dynamics are changing
due to the rise of the low-cost airlines, such as Norwegian
Air Shuttle or WOW Air, who have entered the market and
who basically offer a low cost, no frills service. At the time of
the present study, Air France had launched its own low-cost
carrier titled “Joon” to counteract the growing threat of the
low-cost carriers. [133]
The joint venture partners deliver value to their customers
through a very high level of flight connectivity via their multi-
ple and gateway hubs thereby facilitating their value proposi-
tion. The airlines also deliver and capture value through their
product offerings for the key market segments; the product
offerings focus on both the premium (business) and leisure
travel market segments requirements. Also, their premium
frequent flyers can earn mileage or points on the partner’s
services and, whilst awaiting their flights, have access to the
various partner’s lounges (premium passengers) the latter adds
to the overall passenger experience.
5. Conclusion
This paper has examined, for the first time, the transatlantic
passenger joint venture between Air France-KLM, Delta Air
Lines, and Virgin Atlantic Airways. This is the one of the
world’s largest joint ventures. Despite the increasing trend in
joint ventures in the world airline industry, there has been rel-
atively limited research undertaken on such initiatives. Thus,
this study adds some valuable insights to the literature. The
study was underpinned by a case study protocol and research
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Table 1. The Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines, Virgin Atlantic Airways Strategic Joint Venture Benefits
Joint Venture Benefit Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines, Virgin Atlantic
Airways Joint Venture
Sharing of risk By combining their route networks and coordinating
their sales, the joint venture partners are optimizing
the carriage of passengers on their respective services.
At the same time, they are reducing the risk of un-
availed seats, which enables the partners to optimize
their passenger load factors1.
Synergistic benefits Higher passenger load factors, enhanced market pres-
ence, leveraging knowledge and market expertise, shar-
ing of lounge facilities, and greater passenger volumes
Joint sharing of costs The joint venture partners envisage that cost savings
will arise as a result of the joint venture arrangements.
Joint sharing of revenues The partners have agreed to pool the revenues from
the services offered to their customers
Accessing new markets The combined joint venture was designed to strengthen
the partner airlines transatlantic route network. The
combination of the partner’s networks has opened new
origin-and-destinations (O & Ds) or city pairs.
Participate in the industry’s evolution The Transatlantic market between North America and
Europe is still one the largest intercontinental markets
in the world [137]. The strategic joint venture has
enhanced the partner’s position in this very important
air travel market.
Enhancing the competitive position in a market The joint venture is underpinned by a very high level
of flight connectivity via multiple hubs and gateway
cities thus enhancing their customer value proposition
for both leisure and premium class passengers.
Overcome ownership restrictions This was not applicable as the strategic joint venture
is managed directly by the partners.
Take advantage of offered capacity The partners can achieve higher passenger load factors
from the greater connectivity of the route networks
and from the number of new and existing origin-and-
destinations (O & Ds) or city pairs.
Shared use of knowledge, competencies, and resources The partners offer complementary technical skills, in-
depth market knowledge, and resources and there is a
very high level of cooperation between the partners
Joint procurement of fuel and amenities No details of this were available at the time of the
study
Capturing competitive advantage Greater network opportunities and capacity have en-
abled the airlines to attain an enlarged market presence,
higher load-factors, and increased passenger volumes.
Note (1) Passenger load factors are the number of fare-paying passengers as a proportion of the total number of seats on the
aircraft [134].
framework that followed the recommendations of Yin [81]
and applied Porter’s Five Forces Model for the first time in
assessing the Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines, and Virgin
Atlantic Airways transatlantic passenger joint venture. The
case study has highlighted the strategic benefits that the joint
venture can offer to the partner airlines. The study found that
the Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines, and Virgin Atlantic
Airways transatlantic joint venture, has enabled the partners
to deliver and capture significant value. A limitation of the
current study was that key business performance metrics, such
as revenue, revenue passenger kilometres performed (RPKs),
and passenger load factors were not available in the public do-
main. Should these data become available then a future study
could compare the business performance of Air France-KLM,
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Delta Air Lines, and Virgin Atlantic Airways transatlantic
joint venture vis-a`-vis its competitors.
In conclusion, the Air France-KLM, Delta Air Lines, and
Virgin Atlantic Airways transatlantic joint venture has evolved
over time, with the two original partners Air France and Delta
Air Lines adding new partners – KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,
Alitalia, and Virgin Atlantic Airways. In recent times, Al-
italia has ceased to be a member of the joint venture. The
joint venture has enhanced the partner airlines competitive
position in the transatlantic air travel market. The partners
offer passengers the choice of a highly substantial number of
origins-and-destinations (O & Ds) or city pairs throughout the
United States, Europe, and the United Kingdom. This enables
them to deliver and capture value. The airlines have devel-
oped major hubs, which enhance and optimizes the possible
service offering and flight connectivity, and thus, enhances
the value proposition that the airlines are able to offer to their
customers.
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